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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp.2001).

iv

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issue in this case is variously described as follows:
Where a statute regarding discovery operates to extend a two-year statute of
limitations only "if the period [of limitations]... has expired," does that mean: (1) when
the period has expired as a result of the offense having not been discovered, or (2) when
the period has expired as a result of the State knowingly allowing it to expire in spite of
actual knowledge of the commission of the alleged offense well within time to file a
Complaint?
When the State has fully discovered the alleged commission of a class B
misdemeanor months prior to the expiration of the regular two-year statute of limitations,
may the State disregard that statute of limitations and file the complaint after the statute
has expired, but within one year of the discovery of the offense?
Does the statute which extends a statute of limitations until after discovery, apply
in circumstances where discovery has occurred well within the original limitations
period?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for the issue(s) is de novo; the
lower court acted as a matter of law in granting summary judgment.
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Ann. 76-1-302(1). See FACTS, below at paras. 15-16 for the
complete text.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case: This is an appeal by the State from the dismissal of a class B
misdemeanor for failure of the State to file the complaint within the statute of limitations
period, in spite of actual discovery of the crime well within time to file.
Course of Proceedings and Determination Below: The State filed a class B
misdemeanor after the statute of limitations had expired. The defendant moved to
dismiss, based on untimely filing. The district court dismissed the case.
Statement of Facts:
1.

The defendant, Marie S. McKinnon, is a long-time resident of Box Elder

County and a long-time employee in the Office of the Box Elder County Recorder/Clerk.
R. 74, affidavit of Defendant Marie S. McKinnon.
2.

As a courtesy, outside of her regular work duties, Marie S. McKinnon

notarized the signature of certain persons on deeds. R. 75, affidavit of Marie S.
McKinnon.
3.

The deeds were signed between February 12,1999 and March 30, 1999.

R.2, the Information charging plaintiff.
4.

Sometime between March 30,1999 and June 30,2000, the alleged crime

was discovered by allegedly aggrieved parties who purported that the defendant was not
present when those deeds were signed, or that they did not sign the deeds. R.29, an
investigative report by the Utah Department of Commerce, wherein the investigator
states, "I met with Paul and Ted Hansen at their farm in Bear River City, Utah, on June
2

30,2000." In that report, the Hansen's, the alleged victims or aggrieved parties said, "the
notary public, Marie S. McKinnon, was not present when they signed the document..."
R.29.
5.

On August 1, 2000, the investigator spoke to an additional alleged victim

or aggrieved party, Doreen A. Bateman. R32.
6.

On August 3,2000, the fourth alleged victim was personally spoken to by

the investigator. R.36.
7.

On August 17, 2000, the investigator spoke with the defendant, Marie

McKinnon, who vehemently denied that she had notarized any documents without
having the people be personally present and identify themselves to her. R.39.
8.

Although the alleged crimes had been discovered on June 30,2000, or

shortly thereafter, (See paras. 4, 5 and 6, above) and an alleged crime was discovered at
that time, the State determined to do further investigation and have some deeds reviewed
by a document examiner, who came to his conclusions on September 23,2000, R. 18.
9.

The statute of limitations with respect to Class B Misdemeanors is two

years. Utah Code Ann. 76-1-302(1) states:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for:
(a) . . .
( b ) . . . a misdemeanor, other than negligent homicide, shall be
commenced within two years after it is committed;..."
(Emphasis added)
10.

Two years from the date of the first alleged misdemeanor, that is, two years
3

from February 12, 1999, would be February 12, 2001. See para. 3, above.
11.

Two years from the later of the alleged misdemeanor violations would be

two years from March 30, 1999, or March 30, 2001. See para. 3, above.
12.

In spite of actual knowledge of the alleged offense, the State did not file a

complaint against defendant, Marie S. McKinnon, within the two-year statute of
limitations on misdemeanors.
13.

On April 16, 2001, the State filed a criminal information, charging the

defendant with violation of Utah Code Ann. 46-1-19 et seq., a class B misdemeanor as
follows:
"That MARIE S. McKINNON, between February 12,1999 and
March 30, 1999, within Box Elder County, State of Utah: executed
one or more notarial certificates known by her to be false; or
performed a notarial act with intent to deceive or defraud."
R.2.
14.

Marie S. McKinnon filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the fact that the

State had actual knowledge of the alleged crime, but did not file the information,
allowing the statute of limitations to expire.
15.

The State relied upon Utah Code Ann. 76-1-303 to justify the late filing.

Utah Code Ann. 76-1-303, only partially quoted by the State in its Brief at page 7, is
quoted in full, below. The underlined portion of the statute below, is the part omitted by
the State in its Brief at page 7. No ellipsis or other indication appears in the State's Brief
to indicate that a part from the statute is missing. The statute reads:
"(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a
4

prosecution may be commenced for any offense a material element
of which is either fraud or a breach offiduciaryobligation within
one year after the discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or
by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party,
and who is himself not a party to the defense.
(2) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitations as
provided in Section 76-1-302 by more than three years.
(Emphasis added.)
16.

The statute further reads:
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 76-1-302 has
expired, the prosecution may be commenced for:
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public
officer or public employee:
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a
public office or during the period of his public
employment;..."

(Emphasis added.)
17.

The "period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 ...", mentioned above, is the

two-year statute of limitations on class B misdemeanors."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The statute at issue, which can operate to extend the regular two-year statue of
limitations for class B misdemeanors involving fraud, plainly states that it applies only,
"if the [regular two-year statute of limitations]... has expired." The State was well
aware of the alleged crime months before the regular two-year period expired. Yet the
State sat on the case, allowing the regular period to expire. The State then tried to take
advantage of the extension statute at issue. By its plain terms, the statute only applies if

the discovery of the crime is not in time for the State to file withing the regular two-year
statute of limitations.
The Utah Supreme Court has declared a strong policy that statutes which extend
regular statutes of limitation based on discovery (1) should be narrowly construed to limit
the application of such extensions, and (2) should not be applied where the plaintiff is
aware of the cause of action in time to file during the regular limitations period. The
broad interpretation of the statute sought by the State would allow the State discretion to
ignore the regular limitations period in all cases discovered in the last year of the regular
statutory period, even though the State has actual knowledge of the crime well within
time to file, as it did in this case. The narrow construction sought by the defendant,
would follow sound policy mentioned above and below. The State's interpretation is
contrary to every other application of the discovery rule in Utah case after Utah case.
The above policy also fosters other policies such as (1) minimizing stale cases
brought to the courts, (2) forcing prosecutors to bring cases when known while evidence,
memories, defenses, etc., are fresh, (3) not allowing prosecutors the discretion to sit on
cases until stale, (4) allowing prosecutors to file cases after the two-year period has
expired, but where fraud by the defendant may have resulted in a lack of timely
discovery.
There is only one discovery rule applied in three circumstances in Utah, two of
which are judicially recognized, and the third legislatively. The Utah Supreme Court has
clearly stated that a necessary pre-requisite to the application of that discovery rule, in
6

any of the three circumstances, is the lack of discovery of the cause within the regular
statute of limitations period.
The State's description of an allegedly absurd result if the statute is appropriately,
narrowly interpreted does not really obtain. The narrow interpretation might only limit
the State's ability to prosecute if an isolated case were discovered after the court clerk's
office closed on the last filing day in the period of limitations, as would be the case with
any statute of limitations.
The lower court appropriately applied the above principles to rule, as a matter of
law, irrespective of the statute, that the State could not sit on the case for months and
allow the regular statutory period to expire.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE AT ISSUE
ALLOWS EXTENSION OF THE TWO YEARS STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, ONLY IF THE TWO YEAR PERIOD "HAS
EXPIRED" BEFORE DISCOVERY.
Both the State and the defendant concur that under principles of statutory
construction, the Court should look first to the plain language of any statute. During that
process, the Court should presume that the Legislature used each word advisedly and
should give effect to each term according to its "ordinary and accepted meaning."JJ1W.
v. State, 2001 UT App. 271,117, 33 P.3d 59.
In addition, the plain meaning should be read in context of related statutes and
7

public policy. For example, in State v. Harlow, 919 P.2d 50 (UT App. 1996), this Court
stated, " . . . [0]ur plain reading of Section 76-36-2 is supported by the entire domestic
violence statutory scheme, its legislative history, and sound public policy." Id. at 54.
The Court further elucidated on the requirement that "a statute 'be looked at in its entirety
..."' id. at 54, citing State v. Scieszka. 897 P.2d 1224,1227 (UT App. 1995). The Court
then stated, "thus, this Court must harmonize subsection (3)(a) with the balance of the
domestic violence legislation." Id. at 54, referring the reader also to State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 468 (Utah 1988).
Considering the plain words of the statute at issue, which allows the filing of
criminal complaints for certain misdemeanors under certain circumstances, if the twoyear statute of limitations has expired, Utah Code Ann. 76-1-303, applies only "if the
period prescribed in Subsection 76-1-302 [the two year statute of limitations] has
expired,...". In other words, within two years of the commission of any misdemeanor, a
criminal complaint must be filed. However, if that period has expired, then and only
then, may a complaint be filed if thereafter the crime is discovered, and if the filing is
done within one year of that discovery. The plain language of the statute declares that
the statute only takes effect, "if the [two year] period . . . has expired." This is precisely
the portion of the statute omitted from the State's quotation thereof at page seven (7) of
its brief. If that two year period has not expired, the statute is not even operable. It is a
nullity.
Such a reading also comports with a reading of the statutory scheme with regard
8

to limitations of actions. For example, 76-1-302, quoted above, states that a
mrdemeanor "shall be commenced within two years after it is committed;..." The use
of the word "shall" by the legislature, demonstrates a policy or determination that
complaints which can be brought must be brought unless some clearly stated exception
applies. Admittedly the statute does state, "unless otherwise provided," however, any
exception otherwise provided should be clear and unambiguous.
In the present case, the State argues that the State is not obligated to file a known
complaint within two years as the word "shall" seems to direct. The State argues that it
can have probable cause of the commission of a crime in June of 2000 (see FACTS,
above, para. 3), and yet can fail or refuse to file a case within the two year statute of
limitations for months and months, eventually filing a complaint in April of 2001, rather
than abide by the mandatory "shall" provisions of the statute. Such an action is contrary
to the plain meaning that the two year period shall be followed except if that period has
already expired when the State becomes aware of a crime.
POINT II
IF THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY, THE COURT SHOULD
LOOK TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND OTHER SUCH CONSIDERATIONS.
While this defendant asserts that the statute at issue is plain and unambiguous, this
defendant must acknowledge that this Court could find that the statute is ambiguous as
follows. This argument is only presented as an alternative. One could argue that the
clause in the statute, "if the [two-year limitation] period . . . has expired,..." then a
9

prosecution may be commenced could mean either (1) only if the discovery occurred
after the two-year period has expired and a prosecution could otherwise not proceed, or
(2) whether or not the discovery occurred within the two-year period, leaving the State
free to extend the two years, even if an alleged crime is discovered in time to file within
the two-year period. Assuming that such an ambiguity might be asserted or might be
read into the statute, the following argument is made.
If there is an ambiguity, courts go beyond the plain meaning of the terms used:
"If we find the provision ambiguous . . . we then seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy consideration." State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68, f 3 lP.3d 528,
citing World Peace Movement of Am v. Newspaper Agency Corp.. 879 P.2d 253,25758 (Utah 1994).
(1) Policy Considerations: The Utah Supreme Court has clearly delineated a
strong policy to narrowly construe and limit any statute which would extend a limitation
of limitations. Although many of such strong policy statements are found in civil cases,
if applied there, where only property interests are at issue, they should be given even
greater weight where liberty interests may be at issue as well.
In O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991), the
Supreme Court surveyed all cases wherein a discovery rule was used to extend a statute
of limitations since the case of Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981), the
Supreme Court found, "in all but one of the cases following Meyers.... in which the
application of the discovery rule was sought [to extend a statute of limitations], this
10

Court has rejected the claim because the plaintiffs were aware, or should have been
aware, of the facts upon which a claim could be brought in time to file before the
statutory period expired." Id. at 1144 (Emphasis added). The Supreme Court gave a
reason for such narrow application of any rule extending discovery beyond a statute of
limitations:
"If we were to hold that a plaintiff who was aware of the facts
constituting a cause of action could claim the benefit of the
discovery rule . . . we would open the door to all manner of claims
seeking to avoid the bar of statutes of limitations."
Id. at 1145. (Emphasis added). The strength of that policy consideration is emphasized
by the facts of the O'Neal case. The Supreme Court specifically stated that it regretted its
decision not to allow an exception because of "the trauma and the pain that O'Neal has
suffered and continues to suffer," yet the Court felt so strongly about the importance of
the policy, that it would not allow extension of the statute of limitations, in spite of such
regrets. Id. at 1145.
In Estes v. Tibbs. 979 P.2d 823 (Utah 1999), the Supreme Court stated:
"Courts should be cautious in tolling a statute of limitations: liberal
tolling could potentially cause greater hardship than it would
ultimately relieve."
Id. at 825. (Emphasis added.) The Court continued in a footnote to the above quoted
language:
"We note that itfs a public policy concern, the cost to the judicial
system itself would be tremendous, both in monetary terms and in
terms of scheduling and time constraint. The cost would most
certainly trickle down to affect every claimant whether represented
by counsel or pro se."
11

Id. 825 n.5. The State opts for a broad, expansive, liberal interpretation of the statute
which would increase the number of potential cases to which the exception should apply.
The Defendant argues for precisely the type of narrow construction mandated by the
Supreme Court. The Defendant's interpretation would limit the statute to its plain
meaning and to a narrow application which would not allow the State, as it did in this
case, to have actual knowledge of the commission of an offense, yet wait from June,
2000 through the expiration of the statute of limitations in February or March of 2001,
and then eventually, bring the Complaint after the two-year statute of limitations has run.
The Defendant's interpretation would only narrowly allow additional prosecutions if the
State had not even been able to discover the commission of the crime until after the twoyear period had expired. The State's reading of the statute, gives the State broad
discretion in the face of a known crime, to disregard the statute of limitations and sit on
the case until it becomes stale. That should not be allowed.
The following specific public policy considerations would be fostered by this
Court following the Supreme Court's policy of narrowly interpreting discovery statutes to
limit their application: (1) a diminution in stale cases brought against defendants, (2)
encouraging the filing of case when evidence is more likely to be able to be preserved,
witnesses' memories arefresher,etc., (3) pressuring of public prosecutors to bring cases
when discovered, and not to sit on cases, intentionally or otherwise, to allow them to
become stale, (4) a diminution in the numbers of cases brought before the courts if the
12

State sits on known cases, (5) a diminution in cost to the state litigants and to the public
because cases are brought while evidence is fresh, and (6) allowing the State to go
forward where the defendant, byfraud,has kept the State from discovering the crime.
Another policy consideration points in the direction of a narrow application of the
statute at issue. The two-year statute of limitations sets the appropriate standard.
However, the discovery statute applies only where the case involves fraud or public
office. The legislative policy appears to be that if the defendant has, by fraud,
concealment, deceit, etc., precluded the State from bringing the cause of action within the
regular statute of limitations, then, perhaps, the State should have an extended time in
which to file a Complaint. Or if the matter relates to public office and a person still
serves, then the case should be able to be brought if not discovered in time, in order to
protect offices from potential crime or criminals.
It should be the act of the defendant in concealing the crime or the difficulty of
discovery which should allow the additional time to file, not the discretion of the State in
the face of an already discovered crime, which should allow the extension.
Another policy reason, is fundamental fairness. Where a party, especially the
State in a criminal action, is aware of all the elements of a cause of action within a
statutory period of limitations, the State should be required to file suit, if it intends to,
within that period of limitations, without knowingly extending the staleness of the case to
disfavor the alleged perpetrator.
Similar Legislative and Judicial Law. The State and the defendant agrees that
13

there are three circumstances where the discovery rules will be applied. They are: (1) a
legislative discovery rule, (2) a specific judicial discovery rule where the defendant has
concealed or misled the plaintiff until the statute of limitations has past, and (3) an
extraordinary rule where exceptional circumstances exist which would make the
operation of the statute of limitations irrational or unjust. See the State's concurrence that
in the three circumstances of the discovery rules exist in their Brief at 10-11. The latter
two were judicially created, the first, of course, legislatively. The State admits that,
"when applying the two judicially created 'discovery rules,1 Utah courts have consistently
held that neither rule applies unless a plaintiff can show that he or she did not know and
could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action within the
original limitations. (Eight citations omitted.)" State's Br. at 11.
The State also admits, "most statutes [legislative rules] that create 'discovery rules'
state that the applicable statute of limitations does not even begin to run until the plaintiff
discovers, or should have discovered, the cause of action. (Six statutory citations
omitted.)" State's Br. at 12.
The State then argues that in spite of every other judicially and legislatively
circumstance where the discovery rule applies, only in this particular case, contrary to the
legislative intent in other statutes, and contrary to the judicial application of the extension
of statutes of limitations, the Legislature intended a unique, aberrant, directly opposite
result in passing the statute at issue. The State argues that contrary to the pre-existing
policy considerations of the courts, the Legislature struck out in an entirely new
14

direction, even from the directions it had taken in past statutes. Any ambiguity, if it
exists, should not be resolved in such a unique, aberrant and directly contrary way, but
should be interpreted consistent with public policy, judicial policy, judicial fiat, and
apparent legislative philosophy and intent in every other statute. Only if the meaning
were precisely and clearly stated to do something completely different should such a
result obtain. That is not the case here.
The State argues that because different language was used from other statutes
where the limitation does not even begin to run until discovery, the Legislature intended
the broader interpretation which the State espouses. State's Br. at 12-13. However, the
Legislature's use of different language in the statute at issue illustrates the intent of the
Legislature not to narrow the application of the discovery rule at hand. The following
statutes are examples of those where the discovery rule operates so that the statute of
limitations doesn't even begin until the cause of action is discovered: Utah Code Ann.
78-12-26(1). ("The cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party..."; 78-12-26(2).); ("The cause does not occur until the owner has actual
knowledge ..."); 78-12-26(3) (The cause of action in such case does not occur until the
discovery by the aggrieved party..."); 78-12-27 ("Must be brought within three years
after the discovery, by the aggrieved party,...:); 78-14-4 ("Unless it is commenced
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers,") In each of these cases, the
statute of limitations does not even commence until the matter is discovered. If the
Legislature had used similar language here, any class B misdemeanor regarding fraud or
15

public officer could be brought at any time within a year of discovery, whenever the
discovery occurred. The two-year statute could be completely ignored. The State argues
for an interpretation of the current statute which would have that same result. The State
argues that it has one year from discovery to file, regardless of whether the two-year
statute expires well after discovery and before filing. If that had been the intent of the
Legislature, the Legislature could have used similar language to its statutes quoted
above. The Legislature could have either (1) omitted the language, "if the [two-year]
statute has expired . . . " (2) said that the State could have one year from discovery to file,
regardless of the two-year statute, or (3) said that the State has one year to file from
discovery, or two years from the event, whichever is longer. The last of these three
possibilities is precisely the interpretation which the State seeks. Defendant asserts that
such language was not used, because the Legislature did not desire for complaints to be
filed one year after discovery, if known within the regular two-year period, and not
withing one year of discovery or withing the regular two-year period, whichever is
longer, as the State argues. The narrower construction is consistent with policy
considerations mentioned above. The fact that language similar to the above statutes was
not used, is an indication that the Legislature did not want every case to begin to run
when the matter is discovered, and to allow prosecutors to sit on claims, known during
the regular two year period of time, but the Legislature desired only to allow prosecution
where the type of crime was such that it resulted in the inability of the State to bring
actions within that two-year period of time.
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A comparison to other language used by the Legislature also assists in concluding
that the narrow interpretation is correct. In 76-1-304(1), the Legislature provides that,
"the period of limitation does not run against any defendant for any period of time in
which the defendant is out of the State following the commission of an offense. If the
State Legislature had intended the consequence espoused by the State, the Legislature
could have used similar language that the two-year limitation does not run when the
crime is for "either fraud or a breach offiduciaryobligation" until the crime is
discovered. If the Legislature had used such language, then the filing of the Complaint at
issue would have been clearly timely, however, the Legislature chose not to have a
general tolling of the two-year statute of limitations if a crime is discovered within the
two years.
POINT III
THERE IS ONLY ONE DISCOVERY RULE APPLIED IN
THREE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEREFORE, THE STATE'S
ARGUMENT FAILS THAT INTERPRETATION OF THE
STATUTE IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE CONTRARY TO
ALL OTHER LEGISLATIVELY AND JUDICIALLY
CREATED CIRCUMSTANCES.
As indicated in POINT II, above, the State's position is that the statute at issue is
unique and contrary to all other judicially created or legislatively created discovery
statutes, considerations, or rules. See also, plaintiffs argument that, "Section 76-1-303,
however, is fundamentally different from the two judicially created 'discovery rules/ and
the above cited 'discovery rules1 that the Legislature has created for civil causes of
action." Statefs Br. at 12.
17

Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the Utah Supreme Court, as recent as 1998, has
clearly indicated that there is only one consistently applied discovery rule, which is used
in different circumstances, either by the Legislature, or by the Courts. In Walker Drug
Company v. LaSalle Oil Company. 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995) the Supreme Court
discussed the three circumstances where the single discovery rule may apply, stating,
"We have previously recognized three circumstances in which the discovery rule applies:
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) situations where
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the case presents
exceptional circumstances and the application of the general goal would be irrational or
unjust..." Id. at 1231, citing Warren v. Provo City Corporation. 838 P.2d 1125,1129
(Utah 1992). (Emphasis added). Thus, there are not three discovery rules, but one
discovery rule consistently applied in three circumstances, as indicated above. As
recently as 1998, in Williams v. Howard. 970 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1998), the Court
reiterated the fact that there is one discovery rule applied in three situations: "There are
three situations in which we have determined that application of the discovery rule is
appropriate: [these three situations omitted here]." Id. at 1285 (Emphasis added.) The
Court went on to hold that in a medical malpractice case, the creation of a per se rule,
applying the rule to legal malpractice, is unnecessary, because, there is only one rule
applied in different circumstances. See also the quote from O'Neal, above, at page 9,
wherein the court talks of "the discovery rule."
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In every circumstance or situation in which "the discovery rule" is applied by
appellate courts in Utah, it is applied to deny extension of the statute of limitations where
the partyfilingthe Complaint could have brought the action within the statutory period
of time. The State has cited no Utah circumstance, whatsoever, in which a party who
knew of the existence of a cause of action within the regular limitations period, was
allowed to take advantage of the discovery rule, statutory or judicial. As only one
example, in Williams v. Howard, above, the Court stated that, "as with the plaintiff in
Atwood fv. Sturm, Ruger & Co.. 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992)] Williams does not offer a
reasonable explanation as to why he could not have filed an action against Howard,... at
sometime [prior to the running of the statute of limitations]" Id. at 1285-86. (Emphasis
added). The Court continued, "[W]e stress that 'the discovery rule does not apply to a
plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or damages and the possible cause of action
before the statute of limitations expires/" Atwood. 823 P.2d at 1065. (Emphasis added).
In O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, above, the Utah Supreme Court
specifically talked of the requirement of the discovery rule, that a plaintiff show that he
was unaware of his cause of action until after the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The Court then stated, "This requirement [that the plaintiff shows he was unaware of his
cause of action] would seem a definitional prerequisite to reliance on any version of the
discovery rule, judicial or legislative, [citation omitted]." Id. at 1144 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly established that in Utah, extensions to statute
of limitations, judicial or legislative, simply do not apply where a suit can be timely
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brought within an initial limitation period. As indicated in the immediately preceding
quotation. As stated in OfNeaL this principle applies to "any version of the discovery
rule, judicial or legislative." Id.
The State cites to four cases from other states which hold as the State desires.
State's Br. At 7. In none of those cases does the court mention the policies and principles
espoused by the Utah Supreme Court, mentioned above.
In addition, there is no discussion of balancing the two competing interests (1) not
to allow the State to sit on known cases until after the two-year limitation period has
expired, compared to (2) ensuring that the State can prosecute every case even if first
discovered after the clerk's office closes the last filing day of the regular statute of
limitation. See POINT V, below.
Considering the policies discussed above, the better interpretation is the narrow
one described by the Defendant.
POINT IV
A REASONABLE BALANCING OF INTERESTS
RESULTS IN REQUIRING THE STATE TO FILE
CHARGES WHEN KNOWN WITHIN THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
The State states that the Legislature reasonably balanced the State's interest in
prosecuting crime with a defendant's interest in avoiding prosecution on a stale charge.
State's Br. at 8. The Defendant comes to a different conclusion. The proper balancing
is as follows. On the one hand, defendants should not be subject to stale claims. A claim
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is stale if the State has discovered it and knowingly allows the statutory two years to
expire. On the other hand, if the statute "has expired," and the case involved
concealment orfraud,which, by its nature may not have been able to be discovered
because of the defendant's fraudulent or concealing actions, the case may, nevertheless,
be filed after the expiration of the two-year period, with the other limitations provided by
the statute. That balancing is proper. What is not a reasonable balance, would be
allowing the State the discretion in all sorts of known cases involving fraud to knowingly
sit on a matter and let it become stale, in spite of the fact that it could have been brought
well before it became stale. Such a proper balancing as stated above, also gives meaning
and effect to the principles and directives of the Utah Supreme Court in POINT II,
above, that courts should be extremely cautious in tolling statutes of limitation, and not
allow "a plaintiff who was aware of the facts . . . [to] claim the benefit of the discovery
rule." POINT II, above.
POINT V
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE TO PRECLUDE THE
STATE FROM COMMENCING ALREADY KNOWN ACTIONS
AFTER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD HAS EXPIRED DOES
NOT YIELD AN ABSURD RESULT
The State's argument concerning absurd results fails for at least three reasons: (1)
cases could be brought even if first discovered close to the end of the statutory period;
(2) the State's same argument would apply to the regular two-year period or any statute
of limitations; (3) the State's hypothetical is an extreme, unlikely, ad absurdam
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possibility, which even if it occurred, would be better than allowing limitation periods to
be regularly ignored where long since discovered by the State; and (4) in an
extraordinary circumstance perhaps the judicially created rule for extraordinary
circumstances could be employed. Each of these reasons will be separately discussed
below.
1)

Cases could be brought even if first discovered close to the end of the

statutory period. The State argues that results would be absurd if the State were not
allowed to disregard the original limitations period, because the State might theoretically
be barred in a hypothetical casefromprosecuting if discovered too close to the expiration
of the two-year period to be able to investigate, screen and file the case. However, the
State only needs probable cause in order to file a Complaint, and that can be
accomplished within a few minutes of time. If an offense is "discovered," that means
that at least probable cause has been found, and a Complaint or Information can be filed
immediately. If there is no probable cause to believe an offense has been committed,
then the offense has not yet been discovered. If an offense is suspected but there is not
yet probable cause, the offense has not been discovered and investigation can continue
until probable cause is found. During investigation, as soon as probable cause is
discovered, an Information can be drafted within minutes and filed. As an illustration
only, as a former prosecutor, I and my associates would often come to work in the
morning, review investigative reports demonstrating possible probable cause regarding
crimes just committed or discovered, draft Informations, and be in court by 9:00 am or
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9:30 am for the filing of the Informations at the time of an arrestee's arraignment. On the
other hand, if the facts did not establish probable cause, no crime was discovered, no
information was prepared and filed, and the arrestee was released at the appearance in
court. Investigation may or may not then continue to try to discover whether a crime has
been committed. Thus, the only cases which might not be able to be brought under the
Defendant's narrow construction, might be cases discovered after the clerk's office closed
on the last filing day in the regular two-year period. That is not absurd, even if such an
isolated, extreme case might ever exist.
An absurd result does occur, however, under the State's interpretation where the
State has the discretion in all cases discovered in the last year of the two-year statute, to
sit on all such cases until stale. That is more absurd and is more likely to be able to occur
in a vastly greater number of cases.
2)

The State's same argument would apply to the regular two-year period.

The State's same argument would apply to any statute of limitations. If we are to imagine
possible, but ad absurdum scenarios, as the State proposes, we could imagine a theft by
an unknown person not involving fraud, evidence of the identity of whom is finally
discovered, after investigation or by accident, very shortly before the running of the twoyear statute of limitations. The statute still runs, and the Complaint may or may not be
able to be brought, depending upon timing and resources of the prosecutor. Such an
extreme, imaginative case does not make the regular two-year statute any more
inapplicable or unconstitutional that the Defendant's narrow interpretation of the statute
at issue.

3)

The unlikely State's hypothetical is an extreme, unlikely, ad absurdam

possibility, which even if it occurred, would be better than allowing limitation periods to
be regularly ignored where long since discovered by the State. The likelihood of a case
being discovered within a few hours of the expiration of a statute of limitations so that
prosecution could not be undertaken is remote at best. Far more likely and far worse
would be the State doing precisely what it did in this case, that is, discovering an alleged
crime during the last year of the regular statute of limitations, and sitting on it. The State
talks of balancing. Proper balance would be to require the State to act responsibly where
a great number of cases are far more likely to be affected, that is, where the State may
discover a crime anywhere in the last year of a regular statute of limitations. That would
be far better than allowing the State discretion to sit on all of that greater number of
potential cases, that is, all cases discovered during the last year of the regular statute, in
favor of assuring that the State can prosecute that unlikely possibility that one of those
cases may be discovered after the clerk's office has closed the last day filing is allowed in
the two-year period.
(4)

In an extraordinary circumstance, perhaps the judicially created rule for

extraordinary circumstances could be employed. The State uses a hypothetical, extreme
example to argue an absurd result. Even if a class B misdemeanor were first discovered
just after the clerk's office closed on the last day of filing, not in time for an Information
to be typed up and filed, perhaps the second judicially recognized circumstance where
the discovery rule can be applied, extraordinary circumstances could be employed to
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allow filing if such an unlikely extreme example occurred.
POINT VI
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT'S RECOGNITION
AND APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE'S
PREREQUISITE, FAILURE OF DISCOVERY IN TIME TO FILE,
WAS CORRECT.
The lower court did not accept Defendant's interpretation of the statute, set out in
the above points, because the court felt that the critical language in the statute, uIf the
period prescribed [in the regular statute] has expired," may have been added to the
Section 303 to ensure that a case discovered in the first year of the regular statute would
not create a mere one year limitation. Memorandum Decision, R. 86-87. The court felt
that the legislature may have added the language at issue to avoid that result. The
Defendant would disagree with that position in one regard, because the critical language
does not address cases discovered in the first year. However, in the alternative to the
Defendant's position set out above, the court was correct in applying the principles in
O'Neal v. Family Services, above (821 P.2d 1139,1144 (Utah 1991)). The lower court
appropriately cited to page 1144 of that decision. Memorandum Decision, R. 88. On
that page of O'Neal the Supreme Court mentions the "prerequisite to any application of
the discovery rule - ignorance by the plaintiff of the facts giving rise to the cause of
action." Id. at 1144. (Emphasis added). As indicated above, the discovery rule is found
in three circumstances, one legislative and two judicial. A prerequisite to any application
of the discovery rule, in any of these circumstances, is ignorance by the plaintiff of the
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case during the regular statutory period.
In O'Neal after mentioning the prerequisite, the Court recounted case after case
illustrative of the prerequisite's application to the discovery rule:
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370,
1374 (Utah 1987) (stating that where plaintiff is aware of facts
serving as basis for cause of action three and one-half years before
statute of limitations expires, the action is time-barred); Auerbach
Co. v. Key Sec. Police. Inc.. 680 P.2d 740, 743-44 (Utah 1984)
(stating that where plaintiffs offer no basis for invoking discovery
rule where underlying cause of action is known and claim is brought
one year late, discovery rule is inapplicable); Becton Dickinson &
Co. v. Reese. 668 P.2d 1254,1257 (Utah 1983) (refusing to apply
discovery rule where plaintiff is aware of basis for claim before
statutory period expired); Lord v. Shaw. 665 P.2d 1288, 1290-91
(Utah 1983) (stating that where plaintiff has access to the courts and
is aware of facts giving rise to cause of action prior to running of
statute, claims is time-barred).
Id. at 1144.
In the present case, the lower court applied the principle of that prerequisite to
preclude the State from unreasonably sitting on the case where the State had had actual
knowledge of the case almost a year before the regular statute expired. The lower court
ruled that if the State was aware of the facts in time to file, they had to do so, relying on
one of the two judicial circumstances of the discovery rule. The lower court's
application of the prerequisite to the discovery rule was correct.
There is only one difference between the position of the Defendant set out in the
above Points of this brief and the lower court's position. In the above Points, the abovementioned principle concerning the necessary prerequisite (lack of timely discovery) to
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the application of the discovery rule is argued as a policy whereby the arguably
ambiguous statute should be interpreted to preclude the State from sitting on the case
until the regular statute of limitations has expired. The lower court's position was to
apply the discovery rule's same prerequisite as a matter of law to come to the same result.
The Court stated, " . . . [T]his court... will follow the dicta from O'Neal in holding that,
for the discovery rule of Section 303 to apply, the State must have discovered the action
after the general statute of limitations has run." The lower court's application of the
principles regarding the discovery rule's prerequisite is also correct.
Whether that prerequisite is applied as a matter of policy as in the above Points, or
as a matter of law as in this Point, the result is appropriate and correct, that is, to protect
defendants from stale suits, and to force the State which has actual knowledge of an
alleged defense, to file during any regular limitations period.
CONCLUSION
The order of the lower court dismissing the misdemeanor complaint against Marie
S. McKinnon should be affirmed.
DATED this %J ^ day of February, 2002.

Robert R. Wallace
Attorney for Defendant Marie S. McKinnon
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